Saturday evening’s 2-1 defeat to a Chorley side sat 20th in the National League North, three divisions lower than Posh, was a frustrating, jarring and all-round miserable affair to watch as a Posh fan, although I’m sure the hierarchy at BT were delighted as it became increasingly evident second half that a huge cup upset was on the cards. Posh went into the match as the second highest placed side competing in the second round of the FA Cup, but then came away humbled and embarrassed, as Chorley’s Adelle inspired celebrations once again went viral on social media.
There are a number of areas we could focus upon when looking for answers. Posh’s apparent complacency which saw them outworked by a side who showed more hunger and desire for the fight and played at a much higher tempo than Posh could muster. Posh’s sloppy marking, which saw Chorley score twice from balls into the box under little pressure and amass a penalty assisted 2.14 xG, more than any League One side has managed against Posh this season. We could also praise Chorley’s strikers Connor Hall and Harry Cardwell, who aerially dominated Kent and Beevers all game, winning a combined 19/29 aerial duels providing a platform for Chorley to build attacks in Posh’s half.
But perhaps most worrying was that Posh weren’t just out-fought they were also out-thought. Chorley’s Jamie Vermiglio, a man who manages Chorley by night and at weekends but spends his weekdays as Head Teacher of Locking Stumps Primary School in Warrington, came up with a defensive game plan which caused Posh more problems when trying to build attacks than they were able to cope with. Posh did muster 11 shots in the game, but 7 of these came in the first 26 minutes. After that Chorley grew in confidence, applied their game plan more consistently, and largely dominated the closing 70 minutes.
Below I’ll
analyse some key areas of their plan out of possession. The problems it caused
Posh, the failed solutions Posh tried to adapt with before discussing
alternative plans which could, and most likely would, have been more effective.
The Big Plan: Give Beevers the Ball
It really
was that brilliantly simple. Let Posh’s least technically gifted player have
the ball, make it difficult for him to pass to more gifted opponents, and
gamble on him not having the capacity to hurt you. At least that’s what Chorley
did consistently well after the first 20 minutes. In the early stages we saws some
examples of the plan, but Chorley also regularly pressed Posh at the back,
using their two centre forwards, and occasionally one central midfielder, to
press Posh’s three centre backs. However, as we can see below, this ploy
allowed Posh space to play out through their wide centre backs and wing backs
before playing into either Dembele, Szmodics or Eisa between the lines in
advanced areas. This is exactly how Posh want to play. It allowed them fairly
easy ball progression in the opening exchanges as they were happy to exploit
the space and passing options Chorley’s high press created and looked the
superior side early on.
It’s easy to forget now but in truth Posh dominated the opening 20 minutes. They had six shots and amassed 0.77 xG, while Chorley only mustered two long range efforts from well outside the box. However, Chorley’s plan out of possession after the 20 minute mark became consistently much smarter and they quickly grew into the game.
Chorley matched up Posh’s wing back system by employing a 5-3-2 out of possession, but how they employed the system was as brave as it was successful. Chorley went man-to-man across almost the entire pitch. The three central midfielders man marked their Peterborough counterparts while the fullbacks covered Butler and Broom. In defence Chorley had a spare man with three centre backs marking Eisa and Dembele, which gave them the confidence to move with either player as they dropped between the lines. But it was their first line of defence which was the most interesting. Rather than remaining central, Hall and Cardwell operated as wide forwards out of possession, and attempted to block passing lanes to wide centre backs Kent and Blake-Tracy while also being in position to quickly apply pressure when the ball travelled out wide to these players. We can see an example of this setup below:
The red arrows show Chorley’s forward in wide areas ready to apply pressure to Kent and Blake-Tracey, the white arrows show Chorley going man for man in midfield while the black arrow shows centre back Smith following Dembele into midfield.
Now it doesn’t take a tactical genius (luckily for me) to spot that this gave Beevers A LOT of time on the ball. Chorley essentially gambled on two facts. First, they backed themselves to be able to keep track of Posh’s movements in midfield throughout the match. In the main they did this quite well, although at times they did get pulled out of shape, which is always a risk for a man marking setup. Second, they predicted that Beevers would not be able to pick a pass that would hurt them, and therefore frequently gave him freedom of the London Road pitch, sometimes well into their own half, to carry the ball and pick his pass.
Posh had
some success, especially in the first half, when at times they managed to
create and utilise space through intelligent movement and rotations. The video below
is an example of this. Taylor drops deep into the left half space, this creates
a central passing lane to Dembele, who has moved very deep into a position on
the right of Posh’s midfield and created confusion as to who should mark him,
before moving centrally to receive a ball through the lane created by Taylor’s
movement.
The clip above shows why a man-for-man marking system midfield is so risky. Defensive players can be pulled out of position by opposition movement creating space which can be exploited by intelligent counter movements and a good passer. Unfortunately, the above clip was one of the few exceptions, rather than the rule, in terms of Posh’s buildup play.
Why? Beevers is a technically limited defender with a fairly limited passing range. Typically, playing in a back three masks these limitations by allowing him to shift the ball side-to-side to technically superior centre backs while extenuating his defensive strengths out of possession. Take the recent win against Plymouth as a comparison. When we remove backward passes, 74% of Beevers’ passes were played laterally with just 26% going forwards. When asked to shift the ball sideways Beevers is fine and his limitations on the ball are not as prevalent. However, against Chorley, just 57% of passes were lateral and 43% forward. Chorley challenged Beevers to pick and execute forward passes at the right time. The result, Posh limped through much of the game at a remarkably slow tempo as Beevers was slow to both select and then play his pass. Therein lied the intelligence of Chorley’s plan, let the least technically gifted player have the ball, remove his normal passing options, and make forward passes difficult.
The issue became even more pronounced as Posh lacked their usual out ball to the physical Jonson Clarke-Harris, again raising the question of whether they are good enough in possession to consistently build attacks without a physical striker up top and whether it was short sighted to sign only one player in this mold during the summer. Especially as Clarke-Harris’ injury record is far from perfect.
Posh’s performance got progressively more frustrating in the second half, as both Posh and Beevers struggled to progress the ball and get consistent possession in the attacking third. Below is an example of this. Dembele’s double movement is impressive, first looking to run in behind before dropping into space between the lines. There is a clear and simple passing line from Beevers to Dembele (white line; although Clarke also attempts to move into this space as he clearly does not anticipate the second movement from Dembele), except Beevers attempts an ambitious over the top through ball to Broom (yellow line), a pass he has very little chance of executing and Posh lose possession.
At times Posh’s movement was decent but Beevers failed to pick the right pass, at others it was far to static and he simply had no option. In trying to find an answer to the problem, Posh switched to a 4-2-3-1 in the 65th minute, and initially this caused confusion in the Chorley ranks and overloads in midfield. Below is a good example of this, Clarke and Broom have just switched positions leaving Clarke in space and Chorley centre back Halls is unsure whether to step out of the defence and mark him. However, Beevers again opts to hit a long pass to Mason rather than the pass to Clarke between the lines and the move quickly broke down as Mason became isolated against the touchline.
Beevers went long with increasingly regularity in the second half. He hit six long passes second half, all of which came between the 45th and 66th minute, when Posh switched shape, and resulted in an immediate loss of possession for Posh. Kent firing long diagonals into Clarke-Harris is a valid and dangerous tactic if you can get runners around him, but Chorley would have been more than happy every time Beevers fired long to either Broom or Eisa.
Posh looked progressively more desperate, frustrated and short of ideas as the half wore on. Players stopped moving off the ball as much with Posh increasingly static in a 3-2-4-1, and then 2-2-5-1 shape when in possession. Posh started trying to force passes through the centre, rather than switching play and testing Chorley’s setup up with off ball movement and switch of plays. The final act of desperation saw Posh send Beevers up front for the final five or so minutes and hit long balls in his direction. While such a plan made sense, it was also sad to see Posh resort to such a desperate tactic against a side 89 places lower than them in the football pyramid.
Chorley’s gamble defensively and decision to bank on Beevers not being able to pick out the killer pass was so successful in the second half that they did not concede a shot between the 40th minute and stoppage time as Posh looked progressively more lethargic and unlikely to score. In fact, it wasn’t until the final stages, when Chorley started to lack the legs and intensity to keep up their man-for-man marking scheme and therefore converted to a more orthodox narrow 5-4-1, shown below, in an attempt to congest the pitch and see out the game, that Posh managed to create a couple of late shooting opportunities in stoppage time. Before then their work rate, tenacity and desire to run off the ball, combined with their simple but effective game plan, had completely nullified Posh’s attacking play second half.
What Solutions Did Posh Attempt & What Could They Have Done?
In truth,
aside from sending Beevers up front at the end, not many. Some of their midfield
movement was impressive enough to create space but Beevers often lacked
sufficient vision or technique to pick the appropriate pass. One solution Posh
did employ was to drop Brown deep next to Beevers. By dropping into the defensive
line, Brown left Chorley’s midfielders with the dilemma of whether to follow
him, and be pulled way out of position, or give him space and sit off. They
predominantly did the latter and Posh had some success with this ploy, as shown
below, given Brown’s superior passing range and vision.
A lot of the time however this tactic was not particularly successful, and it certainly didn’t help speed up Posh’s ball speed. The issue was primarily that, with Brown dropping deep next to Beevers, Posh had one fewer player ahead of the ball to pass to. When playing in a back three a better solution would have been a three player rotation between Beevers, Brown and Blake-Tracy, which would have got Brown on the ball instead of Beevers, maintained Posh’s midfield balance and ensured Posh did not have two players effectively standing side by side, reducing their options to play. The player movement is shown below:
From this
position Brown would have been able to dictate play rather than Beevers, while
also having Blake-Tracy ahead of play in midfield and maintaining the balance
of Posh’s shape. The system would also have been easy to transition out of as
the ball was progressed. From a central midfield position Blake-Tracy can
easily over-/under-lap into wide areas, so his ability to drive forwards and
energy would not be compromised, while it is simple for Brown to then step forwards
into his usual central midfield role to support more advanced possession from
midfield. If possession is lost in the first pass, Posh still have three
players behind the ball to deal with transitions.
Both of these rotations would have had the benefit of posing Chorley’s midfielders and attackers significant questions. Who tracks the midfielder dropping deep? Do the forwards still cover the wide passing lane, which now leads to Beevers, or move centrally to cover Brown/Taylor? Who picks up Kent/Blake-Tracy when they move into midfield? These are the sort of moments of indecision and confusion which such rotations create, thus creating space for players to receive passes which would have otherwise not existed.
In a similar vein another rotation Posh could, and for my money should, have employed more regularly was between Dembele and Taylor/Brown. One of Chorley’s centre backs typically followed Dembele when he dropped into an attacking midfield zone, but they would not follow him much further. By dropping deep into midfield Dembele would have become free to receive the ball, Taylor (or Brown) could then have moved forwards into the vacated attacking midfield area. This could have been performed as either a two or three man rotation.
Option 1:
Either way it poses significant questions for the opposition. Does the central midfielder track Taylor, or leave Taylor for the centre back and cover Dembele? How far is the centre back willing to travel to cover Dembele? How quickly will they react to Taylor if he gets free? Again, this creates the level of confusion/indecision needed to allow three of Posh’s best attacking players to get on the ball in space.
Other solutions? Well, Posh struggled to get their wing backs involved in the game. Fergie seemed obsessed with the idea of the wing backs providing width high up the pitch. However, in this position they were both easy for the fullbacks to keep tabs on and almost impossible for Beevers to find. Had they dropped back more often they would have asked the question to Chorley’s fullbacks of whether to follow them. If they do, then this creates space for Eisa, Dembele and Szmodics to run-in behind out-wide (I won’t get started on the lack of runners in behind!). If the fullbacks stay deep Posh have a spare man out wide and a potential 2v1 against Chorley’s wide forwards. This essentially gives them a solid base from which to build attacks.
Posh also had Edwards on the bench, a player who oozes calmness and composure on the ball and with the ability to play crisper and more difficult passes than Beevers. Could he have replaced Beevers after Posh went behind? I certainly think he would have helped speed Posh’s passing game up a notch or two.
Perhaps
they could also have been braver with Pym. On a number of occasions he played
the ball to Beevers in his own box for Beevers to carry out. Could Pym have
been the player to do so on occasion? Could he have tempted Chorley to press
him and create space for others? Risky perhaps, but he has the technical
ability to do so and a superior passing range/ability to Beevers.
Conclusion
It was a chastening experience for players, staff and fans alike on Saturday. Posh failed to match the intensity and desire of their opposition, while Fergie and his players were also left tactically outwitted by a man who spends more time running a school than managing his football club. This is not the time for sweeping change however. Posh have been poor in possession too often this season and at times Fergie has lacked the tactical intelligence to change this. But Posh are second in the table, helped in part by a generous fixture list to date, and have looked much more organised and solid defensively since the start of last season than at any other point during the Darragh McAnthony era.
If Posh have serious top two aspirations then their attacking performances need to improve. But this is a side still transitioning and finding a way to play without the talismanic Toney and that has also lost its entire first choice right side with Ward and Thompson out injured, two players who were instrumental to Posh’s game plan and results early in the season.
There is no excuse for Saturday. It will be filed away in the hall of shame of Posh performances and referred back to every time Posh suffer a shock defeat to relative minnows. However, the first 45 minutes against Plymouth had enough positives in attack to show that Posh are finding the attacking feet in this post-Toney era and Fergie should be given time to turn around a run of three shocking performances out of four. He did it in January when things were looking much worse than they are now and I for one think he will do it again. Although I’d argue that signing a forward who can fulfil Clarke-Harris’ role in his absence, likely at the expense of selling Mo Eisa for a heavy loss to make room, is now a necessity in January.
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